Designers need a way to overcome information-related risks, including information leakage and misuse by their own collaborators during collaborative product realization. Existing cryptographic techniques aimed at overcoming these information-related risks are computationally expensive and impractical even for moderate problem sizes, and legal approaches such as non-disclosure agreements are not effective. The computational practicality problem is particularly pronounced for computational techniques such as the finite element analysis (FEA). In this paper, we propose a technique that enables designers to perform simulations, such as FEA computations, without the need for revealing their information to anyone, including their design collaborators. We present a new approach, the secure Finite Element Analysis approach, which enables designers to perform FEA without having to reveal structural/material information to their counterparts even though the computed answer depends on all the collaborators' confidential information. We build sFEA using computationally efficient protocols implementing a secure co-design (SCD) framework. One of our findings is that the direct implementation of using SCD framework [1] for FEA (termed as Naïve sFEA) suffers from lack of scalability. To overcome these limitations, we propose Hybrid sFEA that implements performance improvement strategies. We document and discuss the experiments we conducted to determine the computational overhead imposed by both Naïve and Hybrid sFEA. The results indicate that the computational burden imposed by Hybrid sFEA makes it challenging for large-scale FEA -our scheme significantly increases the problem sizes that can be handled when compared to implementations using previous algorithms and protocols, but large enough problem sizes will swamp our scheme as well (in some sense this is unavoidable because of the cubic nature of the FEA time * Corresponding author: panchal@purdue.edu complexity).
Need for Security in Engineering Simulation
Design decisions made in the early stages of a product realization process dictate about 60%-80% of the total product's cost [2, 3, 4] . Reduction in time to market, product cost and complexity, and integration of expertise from different engineering domains, are motivating enterprises to prefer outsourcing to in-house development. Information flows among designers, who are geographically distributed and belong to different organizations, play a crucial role especially when making interdependent design decisions. Figure 1 illustrates a few such collaboration scenarios. In such scenarios, risks associated with data sharing, including leakage and misuse by prospective and current collaborating parties, often inhibit the use of sensitive data even though it may benefit the collaboration. Such fears for one's sensitive data could arise for several reasons, including [1] :
Vulnerable Collaborator: Collaborators can have different security practices that fall short of satisfying the security standards of the data owner (i.e., they are more likely to suffer a break-in or some other data breach). Common Collaborator: An entity (say A) collaborating with another entity who collaborates (separately) with a competitor (A's competitor) may create a risk of competitive loss as the common collaborator acquires privileged information [5, 6] . Future Competitor: In a competitive world, today's collaborator can be tomorrow's competitor. For example, Samsung was Apple's main supplier for the iPhone from the very beginning and now they compete in the smartphone business [7] .
In order to prevent information leakage, designers deploy information security technologies such as HTTPS and role-based access control [8, 9] in their collaborative product design platforms. These technologies are aimed at preventing information leakage due to external attacks such as hacking or unauthorized access. However, these technologies fail to prevent other forms of information misuse such as performing unapproved computations over the shared information. In other words, control over the information use is lost when it is shared. Designers need to control the use of their confidential information during and after interacting with their current and prospective collaborators, especially when the collaborators are current or future competitors.
Designers would greatly benefit from ways to enabling the safe use of their information by collaborators, i.e., in a way that can help them perform design functions while preventing any future misuse of the sensitive information. Cryptographic techniques including homomorphic encryption [10, 11] and garbled circuits [12] can be used to protect information from such internal collaborators. However, these are ill-suited for design computations such as sFEA, which are computationally intensive and iterative in nature. Moreover, these technologies require an efficient management of encryption and decryption keys. Legal approaches such as non-disclosure agreements can be deployed to protect the information, but these approaches require considerable expense and effort to detect violations, gather evidence, and sue in court. This brings us to the following research question: how designers can best perform design computations securely in a co-design setting?. This paper is a step towards answering this research question. We propose an approach that enables designers to perform Finite Element Analysis (FEA) securely without the need for them to reveal their individual confidential information to anyone, including their design collaborators. To the best of our knowledge no prior FEA-related work achieves this, nor does it follow from the straightforward use of existing prior results in secure multi-party computation. We believe that further research in this direction can help designers preserve confidential information while performing engineering analysis securely. This work was presented at the ASME IDETC/CIE 2018 conference [13] .
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the state-of-the-art security solutions proposed for different stages of design, and points out the gap in research in secure simulation studies. Section 3 describes secure finite element analysis (sFEA). This section also proposes different ways to reduce computational burden associated with sFEA. Section 4 validates the proposed strategies using experiments and shows the scalability of the proposed sFEA. Section 5 discusses the challenge of applying sFEA to very large number of mesh elements and proposes ways to address this challenge. Finally, closing comments are presented in Section 6.
Literature Review
Activities in a design collaboration can range from the generation and assembly of 3D models to joint analysis of the system and manufacturing. Prevention of information leakage while performing such design functions has become an important research topic in collaborative product realization. Researchers from different domains have proposed targeted solutions that suit different stages of the product design process.
Chang et al. [14] proposed a secure way of storing confidential engineering drawings from leakage to a competitor through a collaborator. For 3D model creation, Elseh and Hamza [15] introduced the use of secret sharing approaches in 3D CAD models to protect the confidential information involved. Martín Del Ray [16] proposed a new secret sharing approach for 3D solid models based on cellular automata. Unlike the former approaches, this approach can be used to hide multiple secrets within the same 3D model.
Researchers have proposed a plethora of techniques based on access control [17, 8, 18] . Of these techniques, the attributes of the 3D model such as features, multi-resolution, and the file containing the 3D model itself, are some of the popular ways of introducing access control into the design process. Different authentication techniques including encryption and digital certificates are used in access control [19, 20, 21] . All these approaches allow designers to preserve confidentiality while data is at rest or during transit, and are mainly focused on overcoming unauthorized edits and protecting access to sensitive information. Chaduvula et al. [22] comprehensively reviewed these techniques and identified the need to protect confidential information during computation with current or prospective collaborators during the product realization process. Existing approaches deprive a collaborator from computing answers that depend on information to which access is not authorized for this collaborator, even when the computed answer would reveal very little about the information to which access is not authorized. In summary, access control allows computations only if the information is accessible. Computations over inaccessible information is not possible. Such extreme handling of confidential information may not be suitable for all kinds of codesign functions such as selection of a co-designer from a group of prospective co-designers.
In the case of 3D model assembly, sensitive information is suppressed by deforming the 3D model, or simply hidden from the collaborators [23, 24] . Cai et al. [25] proposed an encryption scheme that uses a mix of size scaling and deformation of 3D sketches to hide sensitive information.
In cryptography, there are three popular techniques: homomorphic encryption [10, 11] , garbled circuits [12] and secret sharing that allow designers to carry out collaborative simulation computations without revealing to any of the collaborators the confidential information of other collaborators, even though the cooperatively computed answers depend on the confidential inputs of all the collaborators. Among these techniques, secret sharing offers confidentiality preservation with the least computational burden. Based on this technique, Wang et al. [26] proposed Secure Arithmetic and logical oPerations using Additive Splits (SAPAS) protocols and in our earlier work, we showed that SAPAS protocols are computationally lightweight as compared to pre-existing secret sharing-based protocols [1] . Chaduvula et al. also proposed a secure co-design (SCD) framework that allows designers to deploy SAPAS protocols in different co-design scenarios [1, 27] . Straightforward use of this framework to computationally intensive simulations such as FEA faces challenges from the scalability point of view. This paper has two main contributions: (1) a secure finite element analysis (sFEA) technique, which enables designers to perform FEA without the need to disclose any confidential information to anyone (Section 3.1) and (2) strategies to reduce the computational cost associated with confidentiality preservation in sFEA (Section 3.2). In Section 4, we present the experimental results of sFEA.
Secure Finite Element Analysis (sFEA) technique
In this section, we discuss a direct implementation of secure co-design (SCD) framework to FEA and demonstrate its ability to perform simulations without the need to reveal confidential inputs/outputs by individual designers to anyone, including their partner designers. This framework uses SAPAS protocols as building blocks to perform the computations involved in FEA.
Secure Co-Design Framework for sFEA
The Secure Co-Design (SCD) framework consists of a co-design model, security model, an adversarial model, and a secure co-design process. In this section, we discuss these in the context of FEA.
Co-design Model
We assume that two designers, Alice, a structural designer, and Bob, a material designer, are mutually interested in conducting FEA on a product resulting from their individual designs. In this co-design setting, Alice owns the input information related to the product's application such as dimensions (L x ,L y ) and forces (f x ,f y ). Bob owns the information on the material properties such as Young's modulus (E) and Poisson's ratio (ν). The resulting nodal displacements from FEA help Alice in determining the resulting strains, whereas Bob is interested in learning whether the material is adequate for the application or not, which can be learned from the factor of safety. In this paper, we consider a codesign scenario involving the design of a 2D plate, as shown in Figure 2 . 
Security Model
Alice and Bob do not want to reveal their confidential input and output information to anyone, i.e, Alice does not want to share information on the forces (f x ,f y ), and the geometry of the plate (L x ,L y ). On the other hand, Bob does not want to share information on the material properties including stress-strain relationship (denoted by matrix D).
The number of confidential parameters owned by Alice and Bob depends on the mesh element and mesh geometry. For each individual mesh element, Alice owns the geometry of the mesh element and forces associated with the nodes of the element. Bob can choose different materials for each individual element. Hence, in the case of an isotropic material, Bob has two confidential parameters: Young's modulus (E) and Poisson's ratio (ν). For non-isotropic tailor-made materials the number of confidential parameters can be significantly greater than two. Materials designer can selectively tailor material properties throughout the geometry. Such materials are achievable using layered manufacturing.
The confidential inputs from Alice are the straindisplacement relationship matrix (B) for each individual element and the associated nodal forces. Bob owns information on the stress-strain relationship matrix (D). Together, they want to determine the displacement vector (u = [U 2x ,U 2y ,U 3x ,U 3y ,U 4y ]). The ownership of inputs in this codesign setting is summarized in Table 1 . 
The non-confidential parameters are the number of mesh elements and the connection between different mesh elements. Alice chooses the mesh element, mesh geometry, and the number of mesh elements on the basis of the application. Using these, Alice derives the connectivity matrix (C). In this problem formulation, we assume that Alice shares C, the number of mesh elements (n e ) and the boundary condition (b = [U 1x = 0,U 1y = 0,U 4x = 0]) with Bob. This helps Alice and Bob to learn about how the stiffness matrices of individual mesh elements are to be assembled to form the global stiffness matrix (K). In other words, both Alice and Bob are aware of the structure of global stiffness matrix (K).
In FEA analysis, mesh configuration is important. Mesh configuration includes choice of the mesh element and mesh structure (including density, dimensions of each mesh), which can impact the accuracy of displacements. However, revealing the mesh structure can lead to inferences on the load conditions. Therefore, in this problem formulation, Alice openly shares only the connectivity matrix (C) with Bob. Mesh structure cannot be inferred by revealing the connectivity matrix (C).
This form of problem formulation allows Alice to choose a mesh configuration while preserving the confidentiality of the load conditions (f x ,f y ) and geometry of the plate (L x ,L y ). For instance, Alice can increase the number of mesh elements where the forces are larger. Revealing the connectivity matrix (C) to Bob reveals the number of mesh elements, the number of nodes in a given element, and the total number of nodes (n n ). A few possible configurations for a particular connectivity matrix (C) are shown in Figure 3 . From this discussion, we conclude that Bob cannot directly infer on Alice's confidential parameters (B,f x ,f y ) from the connectivity matrix (C).
Adversarial Model
The SCD framework uses at least one external server (denoted by H) to perform the desired computations. The novelty of this framework is that the designers (Alice and Bob) need not reveal any confidential information to H. In the SCD framework, it is assumed that Alice, Bob, and the server are honest but curious. They are honest in the sense that they obey the steps involved in exchanging data with other designers. However, they are curious in the sense that a designer/server can attempt to infer another designer's confidential inputs/outputs. This framework also assumes that there is no collusion between the designers and the server.
Secure Co-simulation Process
As part of the FEA analysis, Alice and Bob are interested in solving Ku = f and determining the displacement vector u. The global stiffness matrix K is determined using Alice's input (B), and Bob's input (D). The FEA algorithm used to compute K and determine u is shown in Table 2 .
All the computations involved in this FEA algorithm are executed using Secure Arithmetic and logical oPerations using Additive Splits (SAPAS) protocols [26] . Our new implementation fixes a weakness in the multiplication protocol (MP) of SAPAS, that caused it to leak information when one of the multiplicands is zero. Figure 4 demonstrates the construction of higher level matrix computations using SAPAS protocols. Next, we briefly discuss the steps involved in the secure co-design process. Figure 4 illustrates the use of different SAPAS protocols with Alice's inputs to construct higher level matrix computations in the FEA algorithm.
At the end of this step, both Alice and Bob obtain additive splits of u. 6. Share additive splits of outputs: Alice and Bob exchange the additive splits of u received in Step 5 with each other. 7. Determine desired outputs: Both Alice and Bob determine (u) by adding the splits received in Steps 5 and 6 i.e., u = u 1 + u 2 .
In this particular problem formulation, we assumed that Alice and Bob are interested in determining the same output (u). However, the flexibility in sFEA allows Alice and Bob to determine different outputs. For example, Alice can determine the maximum strain and Bob can determine the factor of safety simultaneously without revealing their confidential inputs.
Correctness of sFEA
The correctness proofs of the individual SAPAS protocols (refer to Figure 4 ) used in the sFEA technique can be found in [26] .
For the problem described in Section 3.1.1, we used the following values. The values owned by Alice are as follows:
cm and L y = 3 cm. The values owned by Bob are as follows: E = 2 × 10 7 N/cm 2 and ν = 0.3. The displacements (u) obtained using sFEA for different numbers of elements are listed in Table 3 . These results match exactly with the results obtained from an open source FEA software LISA 8.0.0 1 .
Security of sFEA
As all the computations are performed using SAPAS protocols, Alice and Bob have only a split of each of the actual computation result. Therefore, neither Alice nor Bob can determine the confidential information owned by their counterpart in the intermediate steps. At the end of the sFEA, the 
Part 3: Solve linear system of equations 8 Structural designer provides load vector f 9 Mutually solve Lb = f using forward substitution 10 Mutually solve L T u = b using backward substitution additive splits corresponding to the displacements are mutually shared.
The tractability between the confidential parameters (B,D) and displacement vector (u) decreases with an increase in the number of mesh elements. For instance, let us consider an extreme case, where Alice chooses a single quadrilateral element for the entire 2D plate. In such a case, the relationship between the forces and displacements reduces to: B T DBu = f. This equation can result in two possible solutions: one for an isotropic material and other one for a non-isotropic material. As the number of mesh elements (n e ) increases, the number of unknown parameters increases exponentially (for instance, 2 n e in the case of isotropic material). Moreover, sFEA needs Alice and Bob to mutually agree on the computations upfront. This allows Bob to understand and access the risks involved while participating in a FEA simulation. For instance, in the case where Alice chooses a single element for the entire plate, Bob can learn about it from the connectivity matrix (C) which is shared before the start of the sFEA algorithm. With this information, Bob may propose alternatives such as revealing only the maximum displacement instead of the entire displacement vector u or may choose not to participate.
sFEA is aimed at preserving confidentiality and preventing leakage of information through a collaborator. It can be integrated with techniques such as access control, anonymizing techniques, and HTTPS to protect it from attack by entities external to the collaboration. Such integration augments the level of data security. However, this aspect is out of the scope of the current work. In a traditional non-secure setting, Alice and Bob reveal their individual confidential parameters (such as B,D) to each other. This co-design scenario is referred to as "open FEA" in the rest of this paper and the straight forward implementation of SCD framework to the finite element analysis is termed as Naïve sFEA. Table 4 compares the computational time taken by open FEA and Naïve sFEA. From this table, it is evident that the computational time taken by Naïve sFEA is at least two orders of magnitude higher than that of open FEA. This high computational overhead is mainly attributed to the number of rounds, amount of data being exchanged, and required precision levels to avoid the propagation of numerical errors. This high computational time acts as a barrier for the scalability of sFEA. In the rest of this section, we propose strategies that make sFEA scalable.
Hybrid sFEA
Naïve sFEA imposes a high computational cost of security and this is not suitable for the scaling up the number of mesh elements in the FEA simulations. In this section, we discuss different strategies that can help designers in reducing the computational overhead. We term this approach as Hybrid sFEA.
Strategy 1: Reduce communication and number of
rounds The computational time of sFEA is determined by the following three factors: (1) Communication: The amount of data that has be exchanged between Alice, Bob and server H for a single computation, (2) Rounds: The number of times data needs to be exchanged between Alice, Bob and server H, and (3) Computational complexity: The computational complexity of the in-house computations performed by Alice, Bob and server H. In networks, the computational cost associated with communication and rounds usually supersede computational complexity. Hence, the idea is to identify the computations that can be executed in parallel. This increases communication while decreasing the number of rounds. Note that there is a saturation point for the amount of data that can be exchanged over a communication channel.
The determination of element stiffness matrix (K e ) in Part 1 of the FEA algorithm involves matrix multiplication at different quadrature points. As element stiffness is a weighted combination of B T DB and the sizes of B and D are relatively small, all these matrix multiplications can be performed simultaneously. In Part 1 of the FEA algorithm, Alice and Bob own the matrices B and D respectively. So, we modified the multiplication protocol (MP) for computing the matrix product (B T DB) in order to reduce the communication between Alice and Bob. All the element stiffness matrices are assembled using the connectivity matrix C. In this way, the confidential information owned by Alice and Bob can be securely embedded in the global stiffness matrix. The multiplication operations involved in the rest of the FEA algorithm (Part 2 and Part 3) use the multiplication protocol described in Wang et al. [26] .
Strategy 2: Reveal intermediate computations
Naïve sFEA preserves the confidentiality of all the intermediate computations using SAPAS protocols. Such strictness in confidentiality may not be required in all co-design scenarios. Next, we analyze information leakage through this revelation.
Consider the inner product in the Cholesky decomposition in part 2 of the FEA algorithm (refer to Table 2 ). Revealing the value of "s" (in Step 7f) in every iteration loop provides additional information to Alice and Bob (on an average of n(n + 1) 2 times in a single sFEA simulation).
Note that the global stiffness matrix (K) and its Cholesky decomposition matrix (L) are not revealed to either Alice or Bob throughout sFEA. By the end of the sFEA computation process, Alice learns the displacement vector (u). Using LL T u = f and the value of "s" and (u,f), it is not possible to accurately determine the matrix L. Without the knowledge of L, Bob's confidential parameter (B) is secure even after revealing the value of "s". This helps Alice and Bob in reducing the requirement for large precision that is required by Naïve sFEA. Table 5 , compares the precision requirements of Naïve sFEA and Hybrid sFEA to obtain accurate FEA solutions. Leverage the sparse properties of the global stiffness matrix K The choice of the mesh element and mesh numbering provides a structure to the global stiffness matrix (K). For instance, consider a triangular mesh, as shown in Figure 5 .
Note that each node (except the first and the last) is connected to two other nodes. The resulting global stiffness matrix would be a band matrix i.e., the non-zero entries in the matrix are confined to the diagonal and sub-diagonals of the matrix. In such cases, the vector inner product in the Cholesky decomposition can be executed with smaller vector sizes. Similar sparse properties of the global stiffness matrix can greatly reduce the computational load.
In the sFEA technique, Alice and Bob can learn about such sparse properties of K from the connectivity matrix (C). Such knowledge further helps designers in analyzing any indirect information leak or other forms of inferences. For instance, consider a hypothetical scenario where K is a diagonal matrix. In such cases, Alice can infer Bob's material parameters after learning the displacement vector (u). This approach of sFEA allows designers to understand and evaluate such information-related risks before participating in a collaboration. In the following section, we discuss the performance sFEA.
sFEA: Implementation Procedure
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and discuss the experimental results.
Experimental Setup
The following experimental setup is used to determine the computation time and amount of data transferred for performing the computations. We used three different Surface Pro laptops for Alice, Bob and the external server (H) connected via a local area network with 50 Mbps download and 90 Mbps upload speed. For comparison purposes, a common language (Python3) is used for coding sFEA and the simulations are performed under a nominal computational load of the surface pro. We identified computational time and amount of data transfer required to perform the computation securely as the key performance indicators (KPIs). The computational time is measured using a python module named "time" and the amount of data transfer is measured using an open source packet analyzer (Wireshark 2 ).
Comparison of Secure Computation Techniques
Secure co-simulation process (described in Section 3.1.4 uses the SAPAS protocols proposed by Wang et al. [26] to perform the computations securely. Other secure competing techniques such as Sharemind [28] and homomorphic encryption can also be used here. Theoretically, secret sharing protocols are computationally lightweight than Homomorphic encryption as the former uses modular arithmetic and the latter uses modular exponentiation (O(n 3 )) to perform the desired computations. However, in secret sharing the size of the secret linearly increases with the number of collaborators. We chose matrix multiplication to compare these techniques because FEA involves large number of matrix multiplications and the size of these matrices increase with the number of mesh elements. We performed the experiments using the experimental setup described in Section 4.1. The experimental results, thus obtained, are listed in Table 6 and Table 7 . From these tables, we learn that SAPAS protocols are computationally lightweight and requires lesser amount of data transfer to perform the computation securely as compared to Paillier cryptosystem [10] and Sharemind protocols [28] . Hence, we conclude that the proposed approach is better suited for large matrix operations such as matrix multiplication (B T D). Therefore, we use SAPAS protocols in sFEA. Next, we discuss the computational performance of sFEA. 
Computational Performance of sFEA
In Naïve sFEA, we use the SAPAS protocols for all the computations involved in the three parts mentioned in Table 2 . This imposes a requirement of very high precision in all the computations. This saturates the communication channel between Alice and Bob while using naïve sFEA. Moreover, naïve sFEA also imposes a very high computational burden making it difficult to apply for large number of mesh elements. This is evident from the Figure 6 and Figure 7 which compare the computational time and the amount of data transfer among Alice, Bob and server (H) required by Naïve sFEA and Hybrid sFEA for a mesh configuration with four triangular elements. In Hybrid sFEA, we adopted the strategies described in Section 3.2 and this approach reduced the computational burden by approximately 20% and data transfers by nearly 90%. This reduction is mainly attributed to the reduction in communication and the number of rounds (Strategy 1), reveal intermediate computations that do not enable inverse optimization (Strategy 2) and harnessing the sparse properties of the global stiffness matrix (Strategy 3). This reduction enables designers to run sFEA for higher number of mesh elements. Comparison of amount of data transfer required (in KB)
by the Hybrid sFEA simulation and Naïve FEA for a mesh with 4 triangular elements
Scalability of sFEA
We simulated the scalability of sFEA as follows: in the problem formulation discussed in Section 3.1, Alice increases the number of mesh elements. Figure 8 shows one possible way of increasing the number of mesh elements suited for a specific application that Alice has in mind. The resulting connectivity matrix (C) from a mesh configuration is shared with Bob. We modified the experimental setup (discussed in Section 4.1) in order to overcome the network de- lays and performed the experiments on a single laptop. Alice, Bob, and H are simulated using different terminals on a single laptop and data is transferred among these terminals using different ports. Since, simulations are performed on a single laptop, we are presenting the results related to computational time only. We performed the scalability test for hybrid sFEA for two different types of elements: triangular and quadrilateral. For triangular elements, we used all the three strategies discussed in Section 3.2. Figure 9 reports the computational time taken by Hybrid sFEA for different numbers of triangular mesh elements. Figure 10 reports the computational time taken by Hybrid sFEA for different numbers of quadrilateral mesh elements. Note that for quadrilateral elements, we used only strategies 1 and 2. The times reported in these figures do not include the time taken to establish connections between Alice, Bob and server H as it is common for both open FEA and sFEA.
Discussion
The strategies discussed in Section 3.2 provide ways to reduce the computational overhead for security and also allow the sFEA to be performed for higher number of elements. However, the computational burden imposed by Hybrid sFEA is still high when compared with open FEA. This makes it difficult to use for very large scale FEA. In this section, we discuss the reasons for this high cost of security and discuss alternate approaches that can be used to reduce this computational load further.
Cost of Security
The computational time within secure co-design (SCD) framework is directly proportional to the number of operations including arithmetic, set and logical (see Table 8 ). And the number of operations depend on the complexity of the algorithm that is being performed in SCD framework. O(n) is a standard notation used to measure the complexity of an algorithm where n represents the size of input. In the following, we describe the cost of security incurred by performing FEA within SCD framework. Just like FEA, sFEA algorithm also scales in a similar way. Any improvement in FEA are also applicable to sFEA.
In the part 1 of FEA algorithm, the computation time for matrix multiplication by SAPAS protocols is two orders of magnitude higher than the computation time required for open FEA (see Section 4 for more details). This computational load can be reduced if the computations are independent and can be executed in parallel. However, in FEA, the independent computations are limited. For instance, consider the steps 9 and 10 in part 3 of FEA algorithm and the inner loop of Cholesky decomposition of the FEA algorithm presented as Part 2 in the Table 2 . In these computations, the input of every iteration depends on the output obtained in the previous iteration. Every inner loop in the cholesky decomposition involves the computation of vector inner product and an inverse or square root. The communication complexity of vector inner product that involves vector of length n is O(6n) using MP from SAPAS protocols suite. So, for every loop in the cholesky decomposition, the computational burden is given by O(n 2 ). The complexity of Part 2 of FEA algorithm is given by O(n 3 ). Similarly, the computational complexity of Part 1 and Part 3 of FEA algorithm is given by O(n 3 ) and O(n 2 ). So, the total complexity of sFEA is O(n 3 ). Note that the communication increases as the size of additive splits being shared between Alice and Bob increases. This and the computational complexity of the SAPAS protocols are the reasons behind high computation time for Part 2 and Part 3 as noted in Figures9 and 10. In case of 2D FEA, the n increases by 2 for every additional node. 
Potential ways to further reduce cost of security
The security overhead in sFEA needs to be lowered in order to adopt this approach in a real co-design settings. We believe that the following are some of the potential ways to reduce the computational burden further.
Parallel execution of sFEA
The reported computation time to perform sFEA is arrived at by performing all the computations involved in a serial manner. In an open co-design setting, researchers have proposed different ways to parallelize the computations involved and reduce the computational burden. For instance, in part 1 of the FEA algorithm, the determination of the stiffness matrix (K) for each element can be executed independently of each other. Similarly, in part 2 of the FEA algorithm, the inner loop in the Cholesky decomposition can be parallelized. These approaches can further reduce the computational burden imposed by sFEA.Those computations can be executed in parallel within sFEA as well. Table 3 Fig . 9 .
Comparison of average total time taken (in seconds) by the Hybrid sFEA simulation and open FEA using triangular mesh elements Fig. 10 .
Comparison of average total time taken (in seconds) by the Hybrid sFEA simulation and open FEA using triangular mesh elements Execute sFEA using Multiple Servers
The modular nature of the sFEA technique allows designers to simultaneously offload computations to multiple external servers. This is different from parallel execution of sFEA which refers to the use of multiple cores that exist with Alice or Bob or an external server. Connecting to multiple servers is a time consuming task. However, once the connection is established, designers can further reduce the computational burden by offloading computations that can be executed in parallel. The design choices (e.g. number of external servers) in this particular approach can help a designer to find an optimal solution between communication complexity and network latency.
Closing Comments
Information flow between multiple design stakeholders during the product realization process is important to make design decisions. Revealing information to other collaborators may not be desirable especially when it is sensitive in nature. Designers need a way to stealthily introduce their sensitive information while running a joint analysis to make interdependent decisions. In this paper, we take a modest step towards addressing this concern. We propose a secure finite element analysis (sFEA) process that enables designers to perform the computations involved in FEA without the need to reveal their confidential information to anyone. The proposed approach is computationally lightweight, cloudcompatible and secure. We demonstrated sFEA for linear analysis in this paper. However, sFEA can be extended when the analysis involves non-linearities in material properties, forces etc. These can be introduced by modifying the respective inputs (B, D, and f). The nature of additional analysis associated with this non-linearity while performing finite element analysis needs to be disclosed. However, the values of the parameters involved in this additional analysis need not be disclosed within SCD framework. In addition to this, SCD framework can be extended to iterative FEA solvers as well. Chaduvula et al. [1] have demonstrated on how SCD framework can be adapted for iterative solvers.
The scalability of this approach requires further research in order to make it suitable for large-scale FEA applications. Different information revelation strategies are analyzed to help reduce the computational burden towards the cost of security. Further research in this direction would help designers to overcome the fear of misuse of their sensitive information in design collaborations. Overcoming such inhibitions will help designers to provide accurate information and this helps in making better design decisions.
We envision that the SCD framework will be part of a middle-ware in a platform technology where the participants plug-and-play their desired mathematical models such as FEA/CAE while hiding the model parameter values from each other. We foresee that these analysis packages will become standardized and thereby provide assurance on the use of confidential data in a design collaboration.
We believe that this confidential preservation of design information while executing simulations opens up new avenues for research. Some are listed below:
What is the best information revelation strategy?
sFEA provides flexibility to designers about what data they intend to reveal during a collaboration. Designers can apriori evaluate the information gained by the collaborators by revealing particular data. For instance, in strategy 2 (refer Section 3.2.2), the value of the inner product is revealed to reduce the computational overhead associated with data confidentiality. Such approaches raise the following questions: How to assess the leakage risk associated with a particular information revelation? How does this information revelation pan out in multiple transactions?
Zhang et al. [29] proposed an information leakage model to analyze the information leakge associated with an information revelation. Dachowicz et al. [30] used Bayesian inference to quantify the information gained from a particular information revelation. With the help of these approaches, designers can identify the information revelation strategy that minimizes leakage of confidential information and adapt sFEA to that strategy. Further research on this aspect can help designers to choose the best strategy from available information revelation strategies and perform the FEA securely. Because such discussion is not the focus of this paper it is omitted here.
Mesh Refinement using sFEA
In sFEA, both designers Alice and Bob do not know the accuracy of the resultant displacements. In the case of open FEA, designers iteratively refine their mesh until the difference between the solutions between two consecutive iterations is smaller than a threshold. A similar approach of mesh refinement can be done in sFEA as well. Alice and bob to mutually agree on the threshold and run sFEA iterations until the threshold is met. However, this way approach can increase the computational burden enormously. This brings us to the research question: How to refine mesh in FEA simulations while preserving the input/output confidential information?
